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Various normative stances or responses in respect of multiculturalism are distin-
guished and briefly evaluated. The article focuses on what can be called “mosaic mul-
ticulturalism” — a multicultural condition (and concomitant responses) in which
communities and individuals strive to protect (aspects of) their value systems from
contamination or erosion by others and demand public recognition of them. The
article examines the justifiability of such a “politics of recognition”. It tries to show
that the ultimate ground of “mosaic multiculturalism” is an aporia, which allows for
ongoing intercultural critique, and provides a basis for intercultural tolerance.
Multikulturalisme(s)? ’n Kritiese beoordeling
Verskeie normatiewe beskouinge van of reaksies op multikulturalisme word in hier-
die artikel onderskei en kortliks beoordeel. Die fokus val op wat “mosaïek-multikul-
turalisme” genoem word — ’n multikulturele toestand (en die reaksies daarop)
waarby gemeenskappe en indiwidue poog om (aspekte van) hulle waardesisteme te
beskerm teen beïnvloeding of ondermyning deur ander waardesisteme en aandring
op publieke erkenning van hul eie. Die regverdigbaarheid van so ’n “politiek van er-
kenning” word ondersoek. Die gevolgtrekking is dat “mosaïek-multikulturalisme”
uiteindelik berus op ’n aporie, wat voortgaande interkulturele kritiek moontlik
maak en tegelykertyd die grondslag lê vir interkulturele verdraagsaamheid.
Prof W L van der Merwe, Dept of Philosophy, University of Stellenbosch, Private
Bag X1, Matieland 7602; E-mail: wlvdm@sun.ac.za
Acta Academica 2003 35(2): 62-80
First submission: September 2002
The crucial commonality of the
human race is particularism.
Michael Walzer (1993: 19)
Aprincipal characteristic of almost all present-day societies andof the world as a “global village” is the daily co-existence, in-teraction and communication of people of various creeds and
cultures. Today, ordinary people’s encounter with difference, ie with
cultural and/or religious value systems, beliefs and practices different
from their own, is unprecedented and unavoidable. “Multiculturalism”
is generally used as a description of this distinctive cultural condition
of late modern or postmodern societies. The term itself was initially
introduced in Australia and Canada in the 1970s to refer to special
policy arrangements aimed at protecting the distinctness of indige-
nous cultural groups and achieving their equal participation in civil
and political life. However, its denotation rapidly shifted, first towards
cultural diversity as a factual characteristic of societies, and secondly
to social and political movements (especially in academia) as well as
intellectual discourses which strive to promote the value of cultural
differences or to claim public recognition for specific cultural differ-
ences. Thus, “multiculturalism” refers to cultural diversity not only
as a factual characteristic, but also as a desired goal, as well as to va-
rious forms of public policy with regard to both of these, and to a
number of normative theoretical stances or responses with regard to
all three. Failure to note the variety of possible meanings can be mis-
leading and has caused a lot of confusion in debates about multicul-
turalism.
Against this background, my aim in this short paper is very mo-
dest. First of all, I will attempt to distinguish between some of the
meanings or versions of multiculturalism in order to identify the one
which I regard as the most relevant for philosophical analysis. Second-
ly, I will argue that the justification offered for this meaning by its
proponents or criticised by its opponents, namely the equality of cul-
tures, is in fact not defensible. Thirdly, I will argue that it can and
should, however, be justified and defended on the basis of an aporia of
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1. The meanings of multiculturalism
As I have indicated, “multiculturalism” means very different things
to different people. Improvising a bit on the distinctions initially
drawn by Kincheloe & Steinberg (1997: 1-26) one can, for example,
distinguish five normative theoretical stances or responses with re-
gard to multiculturalism as a fact and/or a desideratum.
1.1 Eurocentric monoculturalism
This stance acknowledges cultural diversity but assumes the superio-
rity of western culture and defends or propagates the assimilation of
other cultures to a common western standard. There are all sorts of
convincing arguments against this position, and postmodernism and
postcolonialism have added extensively to the list, but the following
critical flaws can be highlighted as the common basis of most critiques:
• The essentialist assumption that there is one, homogeneous, mo-
nolithic “Western culture” is conceptually naïve and empirically
false.
• The claim to superiority can only be justified with reference to
some supposed universal, objective, transcultural standard, but
any such supposed standard inevitably presupposes (aspects of) a
notion of western culture as being foundational; in other words,
the claim to superiority amounts to a petitio principii and a lack of
self-reflectiveness.
1.2 Liberal multiculturalism
This stance acknowledges cultural diversity but regards it as of lesser
importance in comparison to the “natural equality” and “common
humanity” of all human beings regardless of their cultural differ-
ences. This is also a very difficult position to defend, for a number of
reasons, of which I will mention only two:
• The universalist notions of “natural equality” and “common hu-
manity” and the concomitant liberalist philosophy of freedom,
autonomy and natural human rights belong to an intellectual and
historical development within western culture and are therefore
themselves culture-specific. In other words, liberal multicultura-
lism is merely a disguised form of Eurocentric monoculturalism.
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• The emphasis on “natural equality”and “common humanity” un-
derestimates the human person’s embeddedness in, and indebted-
ness and attachment to cultural forms of life.
1.3 Affirmative multiculturalism
This stance attempts to rediscover or reconstruct and revive some lost
“essence” or repressed “identity” of a culture of one’s own and claims
“oppression privilege” or moral superiority for the members of this
culture. Again, among many convincing points of critique against
this position, two can be highlighted:
• The cultural “essence” or “identity” which is affirmed is concep-
tualised in essentialist, and often ethnicist ways, which makes af-
firmative multiculturalism just another, albeit “reversed”, form of
Eurocentric multiculturalism.
• The cultural “essence” or “identity” which is affirmed can be
shown to be a romanticised fiction and to allow for no critical
theoretical or empirical scrutiny. In other words, it functions as an
ideological construct which defies the very value of cultural diver-
sity in the name of which it is advocated.
1.4 Pluralist multiculturalism
This stance not only acknowledges cultural diversity but regards it as
intrinsically valuable, a public good in itself, and therefore seeks to
promote it. As I will argue later, this position is similar to and/or
compatible with the form of multiculturalism which I regard as the
most relevant for philosophical analysis and defence on condition
that it is rectified on one point of legitimate critique, namely:
• The acknowledgement and promotion of the value of cultural di-
versity should be accompanied by a critical awareness of the
way(s) in which cultural differences are often entangled with
asymmetrical power relations of oppression and exploitation. The
“celebration of difference” associated with pluralist multicultura-
lism should not function as an ideological counterpart or dialec-
tical concealment of the perpetuation of powers such as the ho-
mogenising force of global capital.
1.5 Critical multiculturalism
As summarised by Degenaar (2001: 158), this stance “concerns itself
with the power of self-reflection by means of which individuals be-
come conscious of the way in which their consciousness has been
formed by being socialised within a culture and by the asymmetrical
relations of power in a multicultural context”. Again, as in the case of
pluralist multiculturalism, this position is compatible with the form
of multiculturalism which I consider significant and defensible, but
on condition that:
• The important and valid self-reflective awareness of multiculturalism
as a condition of consciousness should be supplemented by an
awareness of the limitations which it entails for interpersonal and
intercultural recognition, communication and tolerance in the
public domain.
Applicable and elucidatory as these distinctions and assessments
may be, I would like to add two other variations which combine the
normative sense of multiculturalism as a theoretical stance with the
descriptive sense of multiculturalism as a state of affairs. Both cut
across the distinctions made above.
1.6 Mélange multiculturalism
This is a “hodgepodge” multiculturalism. Mélange multiculturalism
(Joppke & Lukes 1999: 8) refers to the experience and social reality
of intercultural fusion and assimilation. As we all know from expe-
rience — and as many features of popular culture vividly demonstrate
— the constant encounter with and exposure to cultural differences
spontaneously result in dynamic and ongoing processes of transcul-
tural osmosis which are experienced as very enriching by communi-
ties and individuals. Indeed, the intermingling and fusion of cultures
in mélange multiculturalism may even take place within individual
persons. As Amy Gutman (1993: 183) observed: “Not only societies,
but people are multicultural”. This form of multiculturalism may
enhance and enrich the value systems of various cultural and religious
communities and their individual members. It is also in tune with
the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of what used to be “authentic
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culture” and distinctive cultural identities. As Renato Rosaldo (1988:
87) observed even before the turn of the century:
The view of an authentic culture as an autonomous internally cohe-
rent universe no longer seems tenable in a postcolonial world. Neither
‘we’ nor ‘they’ are as selfcontained and homogeneous as we/they once
appeared. All of us inhabit an interdependent late twentieth-century
world, which is […] marked by borrowing and lending across porous
boundaries.
Mélange multiculturalism thus serves as a critique on Eurocentric
monoculturalism’s presupposition of some “uncontaminated”, pris-
tine, homogeneous, supposedly superior western culture into which
other cultures are supposed to be assimilated. But it also serves as a
critique on affirmative multiculturalism’s nostalgia for the lost “es-
sence” or “repressed identity” of a culture of one’s own. On the other
hand, it is compatible with and strengthens the theoretical stances of
liberal multiculturalism, pluralist multiculturalism and critical mul-
ticulturalism. However, the scope of mélange multiculturalism is
seldom moral or political, but mainly aesthetic — it relates to music,
fashion, literature, art, architecture and cuisine. As such, it is an em-
pirical refutation of the thesis that cultures are incommensurable and
that intercultural communication is impossible. But we also know
that spontaneous intercultural fusion and transcultural osmosis are
by no means guaranteed in multicultural societies, especially (so it
seems) when it comes to religious and/or moral and/or ethno-cultural
values. Rather than cross-cultural assimilation, intercultural tension
and conflict often occur. This is not a “dialogue among civilizations”,
but what Huntington (1979) referred to as a “clash of civilizations”.
Often this is due to the intertwining of cultural and religious diver-
sity with asymmetrical economic and political power relations, econo-
mic exploitation and exclusivist, oppressive political arrangements,
along with human attitudes such as racism, xenophobia, intolerance
and disrespect. But intercultural tension and conflict may (and often
do) owe their existence to the exclusiveness of (aspects of) different
value systems, or to the resistance of certain differences to cross-cul-
tural integration. A more appropriate form of multiculturalism, and
one which I regard as more relevant for philosophical analysis, is
therefore one which not only acknowledges cultural diversity as a fact
and a value on the one hand, along with cosmopolitanism on the
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other, but which also acknowledges and provides for the mutual ex-
clusiveness and conflicting nature of certain cultural differences.
Borrowing the name from Joppke & Lukes (1999: 8), but giving it a
slightly different content, I will call this form and meaning of mul-
ticulturalism “mosaic multiculturalism” and focus exclusively on it
in the remainder of this paper.
1.7 Mosaic multiculturalism
This refers to a multicultural condition and response in which indi-
viduals and communities strive to protect (aspects of) their value
systems from contamination or erosion by others and demand public
recognition of those values. These demands are often accompanied by
the presupposition, or the explicit contention that the recognition of
the equality of cultures is a justified claim in a multicultural society.
The question, though, is whether the demands for the recognition of
(and special public protection for) cultural differences can be justified
by an appeal to the equality of cultures, ie on the basis of cultural
(and moral) relativism? I shall consider this question first.
2. The equality of cultures and the recognition of 
cultural differences
Mélange multiculturalism is popular and applicable to present-day
societies because of its increasing drift towards cosmopolitanism, at
least on the surface. Mosaic multiculturalism is popular and appli-
cable because it expresses and articulates the increasing persistence in
present-day societies of what appears to be the opposite of cosmopo-
litanism, namely the “politics of difference”, which can also be term-
ed the “politics of recognition”.1 This refers to the current awareness
of people’s attachment to cultural differences, and their consequent
demands for public recognition (and protection) of these.
As indicated earlier, the meta-cultural presupposition that is ge-
nerally invoked by advocates of mosaic multiculturalism in their de-
1 The reference is of course to the important essay, The politics of recognition, by
Charles Taylor. Cf Taylor (1994) as well as his earlier analysis in Taylor 1991.
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fence of a “politics of recognition” is that the equal worth of different
cultural and religious value sytems should be acknowledged and that
demands for public recognition of cultural differences are therefore
justified; moreover, that all cultural and religious value systems
should be accorded equal respect.2 I am convinced, though, that this
presupposition can be shown to be invalid.
To begin with — and here I follow Charles Taylor (1994: 66-73)
— the claim for the recognition of equality presupposes that it is
possible to judge other cultures, ab initio, with reference to meta- or
transcultural criteria, while such a judgement — if at all possible —
can actually only be reached after a thorough study of other cultures.
Only by means of such a study can a “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer)
occur and a new “vocabulary of comparison” develop that will enable
one to articulate the contrasts. If and when a position is finally reached
where it becomes possible to validate an initial assumption of equal
value, such a position will encompass a new understanding of what
is valuable:
2 Kolakowski (1990: 19-21) distinguishes between four meanings of what he
calls “the principle [that] all cultures are equal”. The first is that it really refers
only to the artistic expression of cultures, according to which it can be deter-
mined that there are no supercultural, transcendental norms upon which aes-
thetic judgements may be based. This is less problematic, he contends, because
“[in] the sphere of art, tolerance comes easily, either because we are indifferent
or because we see nothing logically wrong in the confrontation of different aes-
thetic criteria”. It is, however, highly problematic in a second case, when it is
also regarded as applicable to “the spheres of religion and morality, law and
intellectual rules” because these spheres concern “genuinely conflicting norms
which cannot coexist in mutual indifference, to be exhibited side by side like
museum pieces from different civilizations”. All that it can mean in the latter
case is a declaration of indifference — “I live in a particular culture, and other
cultures do not interest me...” — rather than equality. It is therefore a misfor-
mulation fit only to be ignored. Thirdly, it may mean that there are indeed
absolute, a-historical standards, and that even contradictions among cultural
norms and practices in terms of these standards are all equal — a position that
is evidently self-undermining and deserves no further attention. The fourth
meaning is that “there are no absolute, a-historical standards by which to judge
any culture”.
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an understanding of what constitutes worth that we couldn’t possibly
have had at the beginning […] (a) judgment [that we have reached]
partly through transforming our own standards (Taylor 1994: 67).3
But, to push the argument even beyond Taylor’s critique, what is
really at stake in mosaic multiculturalism is precisely that which de-
fies a common vocabulary and is disclosed in the very failure of hori-
zons to fuse.
Secondly, the claim that the equality of the cultural difference at
stake must be appreciated from the outset is self-undermining in the
sense that the difference itself is implicitly annihilated. It is, after all,
implied that those of whom recognition is demanded from the outset,
are already possessed of the appropriate criteria of judgement. But
what meta-cultural or culturally neutral criteria can those of whom
recognition is expected have, other than those of their own cultural at-
tachments and differences? In short: to claim recognition in advance
for the value of that which is different is to subject it, from the outset,
to precisely that from which it differs, a particular set of cultural cri-
teria in terms of which it is expected to be valued and thereby to sus-
pend its very difference. That which is different is then not apprecia-
ted in its own right, but only insofar as it appears as the exotic in the
light of one’s own and the similar:
By implicitly invoking our standards to judge all civilizations and
cultures, the politics of difference can end up making everyone the
same (Taylor 1994: 71).
Another justification given for the thesis that cultures should be
considered equal or should be accorded equal respect is therefore that
it is not possible to take up a position from where the respective
value or “truth” of cultures may be judged, because there is no cul-
turally neutral set of criteria. Because of the absence or impossibility
of such criteria, judgement should be suspended, resulting in equal
respect. But the reasoning behind this imposition of the suspension
of judgement cannot itself be separated from (values institutionalised
3 Without referring to Taylor, Procee (1991: 26) calls this position “communica-
tive universalism”, pointing on the one hand to the thought of Habermas and
emphasising on the other that this still implies a form of universalism, al-




in) a specific cultural practice, namely cultural anthropology (and
epistemology and hermeneutics), in which a specific set of (Western)
cultural differences is sanctioned above others! The claim that cul-
tures are equal is a disguised performative contradiction. As Kola-
kowski (1990: 19) correctly argues:
[T]he very act of suspending judgment is culturally rooted: it is an
act of renunciation, possible only from within a culture which,
through learning to question itself, has shown itself capable of un-
derstanding another. For this reason the anthropologist’s stance is
not really one of suspended judgment; what we call the spirit of
research is a cultural attitude, one peculiar to Western civilization
and its hierarchy of values. Whether I boast of belonging to a civili-
zation that is absolutely superior, or on the contrary, extol the noble
savage, or whether, finally, I say all cultures are equal, I am adopting
an attitude and making a judgment, and I cannot avoid doing so.
Moreover, it does not follow from a plea for a suspension of judge-
ment that all cultures may therefore be claimed to be equal. The a
posteriori conclusion that cultural differences can only be understood
or appreciated from inside, or that it is impossible to establish cultu-
rally neutral criteria, turns into the claim that the equality of cul-
tures must be recognised a priori. This shift from an a posteriori con-
clusion (which might be valid) to an a priori premise is a fallacious
deduction of a normative claim from a state of affairs.
There is, however, another important reason why the equality of
cultures proclaimed in mosaic multiculturalism (as a justification for
demands that cultural differences should be recognised) should be
rejected. At this point the analysis shifts from a pure logical one to a
more cultural-historical one. The question is namely: Why do people
today demand recognition of cultural differences? One may argue
that recognition has always been an essential and universal human
need (Honneth 1995), and even that this need for recognition and
the various ways and means in terms of which individuals and socie-
ties deal with it have always been structured or mediated by culture.
“Culture” can, of course, also mean many different things, but in this
context Tomlinson’s (1999: 18) definition will suffice, namely
[…] the order of life in which human beings construct meaning
through practices of symbolic representation […] The ways in
which people make their lives, individually and collectively, mean-
ingful by communicating with each other.
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But what exemplifies the present-day “politics of recognition” is
not that recognition is mediated by culture, but that recognition is
claimed for culture. In other words, the human need for recognition,
previously mediated by culture — and differently mediated by dif-
ferent cultures — has been transformed into the need and demand for
the recognition of cultural differences. Culture, previously the me-
diation of the need for recognition, has become the object of (the de-
mand for) recognition. This, I would like to argue in accordance with
a number of authors, is due to the global expansion of the cultural
conditions of modernity.
Following and supplementing Charles Taylor’s analysis, the gene-
alogy of the present-day “politics of recognition” can be traced. First,
modernity and the inauguration of democracy in Europe brought
about the collapse of existing social hierarchies and established the
equal dignity of citizens. Onto the right to equal dignity were grafted
(by the end of the eighteenth century) the ideals of autonomy and
authenticity, transforming the recognition of equal dignity into the
universal recogntion of equal rights: the right to choose and realise
one’s own view of the “good” (autonomy) and the right of an indivi-
dual or community to self-determination in accordance with a (sup-
posed) unique pre-given “self” or “identity” (authenticity). In this
way, what was achieved is twofold: first, the legitimation of the
demand for the recognition of equal rights (whatever the differences),
ie the appropriation of the right to difference; secondly, the legitima-
tion of the demand for the equal recognition of the differences them-
selves.
To formulate it differently: the human need for recognition has al-
ways been culturally structured and mediated, but it was never di-
rected at a particular culture or cultural contents/differences as in the
case of the present-day “politics of recognition”. An analysis of the
genealogy of the “politics of recognition” (of which only the major
conclusions could be discussed above) shows that the cultural-
historical process of modernity converted the need for recognition
into a right to be different and to claim recognition for the inherent
value or significance of that difference, for example: a certain com-
munity culture; a language of one’s own; a unique set of culturally
specific values, symbols, codes, and/or rituals; a specific gender; an
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alternative sexual preference and orientation, and so forth. In this
way the anthropological-cultural practices of recognition have been
transformed into the politics of cultural identity, into a power struggle
to gain the protection of the right to cultural difference,4 resulting in
the codification (for example, constitutionally and institutionally) of
culture-specific rights, typical of present-day multicultural states.5 It
encompasses a spectrum from the right to ethnic, religious and lan-
guage differences through to culturally defined differences in gender
and sexual preference. By means of this codification of the right to
difference, the importance that people and communities attach to
certain cultural differences, and their attachment to these differences,
gain a measure of respect. This is what mosaic multiculturalism as a
normative theoretical stance and public policy wants to achieve (and
has succeeded in achieving in most liberal democracies). As Joppke
& Lukes (1999: 1) remind us:
[…] courts in liberal states have been widely receptive to multicul-
tural minority claims […] claims for minority rights are not an ab-
stract imposition on liberal states, but reflective of the very practice
of liberal states.
But protection of certain cultural-specific rights still does not answer
to the need for the recognition of the inherent value of what is repre-
4 Turner (1993: 423,424) makes a useful connection between multiculturalism
as “one manifestation of the postmodernist reaction to the delegitimation of the
state [...] a material decentering process grounded in the organization of capital
on a global scale [...]” and this claim — in my words — of the right to cultural
difference. Because of the coincidence of a whole series of factors the concept of
culture is undergoing an important transformation in meaning, according to
Turner, in that it is experienced, apart from nationality, as “a source or locus of
collective rights to self-determination”. The following formulation brings to
light particularly well the correspondence between the thesis I posit here and
the consequences of Turner’s analysis: “Culture as such becomes a source of
values that can be converted into political assets [...] Culture in these new
senses, as a universal category distinct from, but subsuming, specific cultures,
can be understood as the cultural form of the new global historical conjuncture:
in effect, a metaculture [...]”.
5 An example in this instance is the new South African constitution with its
protection of cultural-specific rights and broad definition of categories against
which discrimination is prohibited.
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sented by such rights. To this distinction between the right to differ-
ence and the claim to the recognition of the inherent value of the dif-
ference itself, I will return shortly.
But to recapitulate briefly: the point of the discussion is that the
equality of cultures proclaimed in mosaic multiculturalism (as a jus-
tification for demands that cultural differences should be recognised)
should be rejected, not only on logical grounds, but also on cultural-
historical grounds. Why? Because the present global condition of
cultural diversity and pluralism is the result of and was made pos-
sible by the paradoxical way in which the life forms of modernity and
the specific culture of the Enlightenment developed, first in Europe,
and were subsequently disseminated worldwide, assimilated by other
cultures, and are now finding their completion (which is at the same
time an impasse) in postmodernity.6 The present “politics of recog-
nition”, originally a specific cultural particularism, part of the life
forms of modernity and the Enlightenment, found (at first) transcul-
tural and then (finally) global legitimacy.7 The result is accordingly
not the eradication of cultural differences, but a more profound de-
mand for the recognition of the right to difference. The life forms of
modernity are the cultural preconditions for “the politics of differ-
ence” and were assimilated transculturally all over the (post)modern
world. As Huntington (1997: 78) puts it:
Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization.
Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized with-
6 By pluralism is meant not only societies marked by plurality or heterogeneity
(a descriptive meaning) but also those in which diversity is experienced as a po-
sitive value (a more normative meaning). This connects with Sartori (1997: 61),
who draws a whole series of clarifying distinctions with reference to “pluralism”
and “multiculturalism”. He states, for instance, that: “[...] a pluralistic culture
is all the more authentic to the extent that [...] difference (and not uniformity),
dissent (and not unanimity), change (and not immutability) are ‘good things’
— these are the value-beliefs that properly belong to the cultural context of
pluralism and that a pluralistic culture should convey in order to be true to its
name”.
7 Gellner argues the same point convincingly in more than one instance with re-
ference to what he calls the culture of the Enlightenment, and more specifically
with reference to the transculturality of modern science. For a concise formula-
tion of this, see Gellner 1992: 58-9.
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out abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western
values, institutions, and practices […] Modernisation, instead
strengthens those cultures […].
The reason for this is that the life forms of modernity could be
transmitted to other cultures and universally assimilated because
they do not mediate the attachment to specific values for which
people rely upon particular cultural life forms. The universalism of
equal rights, the universal recognition of human dignity, is an empty
universalism. It does not destroy cultural differences; it merely cre-
ates an existential vacuum that can be filled or covered up only by
falling back onto specific forms of particular communal experiences
of identity, attachments and values. In this way the global expansion
of modernity is a transcultural extension of the preconditions for cul-
tural differences to be claimed as rights and for the claim to equal
recognition for culturally specific values. Thus the current revivals of
various forms of cultural particularism are not the last spasms of out-
dated premodern attitudes or reactionary resistances to globalisation,
but the necessary supplement to modernity (Turner 1993: 423); they
are symptoms of the postmodern culmination and impasse of mo-
dernity. In this light postmodernity refers to the unique cultural con-
ditions of societies in which this ironic “logic” or dialectic of mo-
dernity has reached its zenith; in other words, in which the radical
pluralising of societies and cultures has been fully realised in and
through the same movement of transcultural and global expansion of
modernity.8
This explains why postmodern societies are characterised by the
condition and theoretical response of mosaic multiculturalism. At
the same time, it clearly demonstrates that the demands of mosaic
8 A similar understanding of the ambivalent “logic” or (what I prefer to call) the
dialectic of modernity is forcefully advocated by Zygmunt Bauman in his view
on the meaning of postmodernity and more specifically in his exploration of the
nature and scope of postmodern ethics. As he formulates it in his introduction
to Postmodern Ethics (Bauman 1993: 5): “[…] a society which is ‘modern’ […]
constantly but vainly tries to ‘embrace the unembraceable’, to replace diversity
with uniformity and ambivalence with coherent and transparent order — and
while trying to do this turns out unstoppably more divisions, diversity and am-
bivalence than it has managed to get rid of”.
multiculturalism for the recognition of cultural differences cannot be
justified on the basis of some supposed equality of cultures, but
should rather be reduced to this dialectic of modernity.
3. The aporetic ground of multiculturalism
If the demand for the recognition of cultural differences cannot justly
be based on the claim that cultures are equal, on what can it be
based? I want to propose that it may be based on an aporia which also
sets limits to the “politics of recognition” and casts a shadow over the
prospects of our intercultural communication. Because of this aporia,
the recognition of certain cultural differences becomes stultified in
contemporary  societies. This is what I wish to focus on in closing.
As we have seen, it is only possible to demand recognition for cul-
tural differences  because certain cultural forms of life, modernity, a
specific particularism, have been universalised, so creating the space
for an appropriation of the right to difference. Even those — for
example, in deeply multicultural societies — who demand recogni-
tion for cultural differences which do not allow for the right to dif-
fer, do so on the grounds of the moral self-evidence or superior value
enjoyed by the right to difference in (post)modern societies. The
empty universalism of the recognition of equal rights created a glo-
bal sounding-board against which particular claims for the recogni-
tion of cultural differences became audible and magnified. This
means, however, that the claim for the recognition of cultural differ-
ences must be nuanced accordingly.
First, what can be rightfully claimed is the recognition of the
right to different cultural values, but only to the extent that and
insofar as these cultural values do not undermine the right to differ-
ence itself. Recognition of the right to differing values is, however,
not yet recognition of the inherent worth of those values, ie recogni-
tion that people who are attached to those values are justly attached
to what is in itself valuable. Merely to extend recognition of the right
to difference is to abstract the difference itself from the value(s) that
in the first place motivate(s) the appropriation of the right to dif-
ference and the claim for recognition. Or, put in another way, when
certain cultural values are experienced by individuals and groups as so
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significant that they demand others’ recognition of them, and that
they themselves demand the recognition of their right to difference
with regard to these values, it is because they are convinced of the
inherent worth of these values. They stand in such an immutable re-
lationship to them that they not only demand recognition of their
right to be different, but demand that the value of the difference
itself should be recognised.9
It therefore seems that a second rightful claim to recognition fol-
lows from the nature of our relationship to such values, namely the
claim to the recognition of the inherent worth of such values. If this
is the case, it means that the recognition of the right to difference of
an “other” cannot be abstracted from the  recognition of the inherent
value (in the eyes of the other) which is exactly what differs from the
values to which we ourselves are inextricably attached.10
This can also be formulated in a different way: the values for which
the other demands recognition are incarnated in concrete  forms — a
specific language, a certain code of conduct, a particular (and at first
glance trivial) set of social conventions. But, similarly, the values of
those from whom recognition is demanded are also incarnated; they
cannot suspend them or ignore them within the “politics of recogni-
tion”. The intercultural recognition reaches a stalemate in this aporia,
on the rightfulness of an impossible claim or the impossibility to
adhere to a rightful claim. The claim to recognise not only the right
to difference, but the value of the difference in its incarnated form to
the other herself appears as a rightful claim in the light of the immu-
table relationship within which we stand towards our own values. But
the very incarnatedness of these values — our own unforfeitable passi-
9 I am following De Dijn (1997: 151-7; 1994a: 77-80; 1994b: 102-3) in this
regard.
10 An example of such an immutable relationship, a relation pointing to the pas-
sivity of the subject, is our relation to our own name, which is in itself a mean-
ingless word. Yet it is not all the same to us whether or not our mere right to
a name, any name, is recognised. There is, after all, no other way to recognise
somebody’s right to a name than to recognise her name as inextricably hers, the
name of her person. Even in cases of slander the issue is not that of a name, but
rather of the immutable relationship between a person and the value he or she
attaches to that name!
vity towards them — precludes any possibility of our truly recogni-
sing the inherent value of the difference of the other.
In this aporia we are confronted with our own finitude, with the
realisation that the difference of the other is just as valuable to her as
my difference from her is to me. It is not impossible for me to under-
stand that the difference for which the other demands recognition has
an inherent value. In certain cases, however, it may well be impos-
sible for me to recognize this inherent value. The claim that the inhe-
rent value, the “truth” of the different values themselves, should be
recognised, cannot be met. Here we encounter a limit to intercultural
exchange and communication, an impossibility of mutual under-
standing and respect.
The limit of mosaic multiculturalism is this aporia of recognition.
Because of this aporia (and not because of some objective, universal,
transcultural meta-principles of evaluation), intercultural critique
will and should be part of the intercultural exchange and multicul-
tural existence. At the same time, because this aporia reveals our fini-
tude, it provides a ground for intercultural tolerance — in fact, a bet-
ter ground for tolerance than cultural relativism. Cultural relativism,
which proclaims all cultures to be equal, underestimates the reality
and significance of the “other” and therefore leads easily to a disre-
gard of or indifference towards the “other”. The aporia of recognition
which only reveals itself when we really engage with the “other” in
his/her incomprehensible “otherness” continuously confronts us with
our finitude and can therefore create a shared consciousness of mutual
respect. It sets a limit to mosaic multiculturalism. Nevertheless, it is
this aporia, rather than cultural relativism, which provides the ulti-
mate justification for mosaic multiculturalism.
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